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Abstract
We study online pricing algorithms for the Bayesian selection problem with production con-
straints and its generalization to the laminar matroid Bayesian online selection problem. Consider
a firm producing (or receiving) multiple copies of different product types over time. The firm can
offer the products to arriving buyers, where each buyer is interested in one product type and has
a private valuation drawn independently from a possibly different but known distribution.
Our goal is to find an adaptive pricing for serving the buyers that maximizes the expected
social-welfare (or revenue) subject to two constraints. First, at any time the total number of sold
items of each type is no more than the number of produced items. Second, the total number
of sold items does not exceed the total shipping capacity. This problem is a special case of the
well-known matroid Bayesian online selection problem studied in Kleinberg and Weinberg [2012],
when the underlying matroid is laminar.
We give the first Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) for the above problem as
well as its generalization to the laminar matroid Bayesian online selection problem when the depth
of the laminar family is bounded by a constant. Our approach is based on rounding the solution of
a hierarchy of linear programming relaxations that systematically strengthen the commonly used
ex-ante linear programming formulation of these problems and approximate the optimum online
solution with any degree of accuracy. Our rounding algorithm respects the relaxed constraints of
higher-levels of the laminar tree only in expectation, and exploits the negative dependency of the
selection rule of lower-levels to achieve the required concentration that guarantees the feasibility
with high probability.
1 Introduction
This paper revisits a quintessential problem in online algorithms and mechanism design: how should
a planner allocate a limited number of goods or resources to a set of agents arriving over time?
Examples of this canonical problem range from selling seats in a concert hall to the multi-billion dollar
online retail and sponsored-search auctions. In many of these applications, it is often reasonable to
assume that each agent has a private valuation drawn from a known distribution. Moreover, the
allocation is often subject to combinatorial constraints such as matroids, matchings, or knapsacks.
The goal of the planner is then to maximize social-welfare, i.e. the total value of served agents.1
This allocation problem, termed as Bayesian online selection, originated from the seminal work of
Krengel and Sucheston in the 70s, and has since been studied quite extensively (see Lucier, 2017, for
a comprehensive survey).
1In a single-parameter Bayesian setting like in this paper, the problem of maximizing the revenue can also be
reduced to the maximization of welfare with a simple transformation using (ironed) virtual values [Myerson, 1981].
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A common approach to the above stochastic online optimization problem is to attain the so-called
prophet inequalities; the goal there is to evaluate the performance of an online algorithm relative to an
offline “omniscient prophet”, who knows the valuation of each agent and therefore can easily maximize
the social-welfare. The upshot of a significant line of work studying prophet inequalities is that in
many complex combinatorial settings there exist simple and elegant take-it-or-leave-it pricing rules
that obtain a constant factor approximation with respect to the omniscient prophet benchmark.
Examples include (but are not limited to) matroids [Samuel-Cahn et al., 1984, Hajiaghayi et al.,
2007, Chawla et al., 2010, Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2012], matchings [Chawla et al., 2010, Alaei
et al., 2012, Alaei, 2014], and combinatorial auctions [Feldman et al., 2013]. Somewhat surprisingly,
it is also often possible to prove matching information theoretic lower-bounds (e.g. in matroids), i.e.
showing that no online algorithm can obtain a better constant factor of the omniscient prophet than
that of the simple pricing rules.
In this paper, we deviate from the above framework and dig into the question of characterizing
and computing optimum online policies. Given the sequence of value distributions, Richard Bellman’s
“principle of optimality” [Bellman, 1954] proposes a simple dynamic programming that computes the
optimum online policy for all of the above problems. Again, these policies turn out to be simple
adaptive pricing rules. On the flip side, the dynamic program needs to track the full state of the
system and therefore it often requires exponential time and space.
While there are fairly strong lower bounds for the closely related computation of Markov Decision
Processes (see Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis [1987] for the PSPACE-hardness of the general Markove
decision processes with partial observations), the computational complexity of the stochastic online
optimization problems with a concise combinatorial structure, like the one we are considering here,
is poorly understood. Here, we ask whether it is possible to approximate the optimum online in
polynomial time, and obtain improved approximation factors compared to those derived form the
prophet inequalities. If we answer this question in the affirmative, it justifies the optimum online
policy as a less pessimistic benchmark compared to the omniscient prophet benchmark.
We focus on two special cases of the Bayesian online selection problem. Consider a firm producing
(or receiving) multiple copies of different product types over time. The firm offers the products to
arriving unit-demand buyers, where each buyer is interested in one product type and they have
valuations drawn independently from known possibly non-identical distributions. The goal is to
compute approximations to the optimum online policy for maximizing social-welfare (or revenue)
subject to two constraints. First, at any time the total number of sold items of each type is no more
than the number of produced items. Second, the total number of sold items does not exceed the total
shipping capacity. We term this stochastic online optimization problem as production constrained
Bayesian selection .
We also consider a generalization of the above problem to the laminar Bayesian selection, which
is a special case of the well-known matroid Bayesian online selection problem studied in Kleinberg
and Weinberg [2012], when the underlying matroid is laminar. In this problem, elements arrive over
time with values drawn from heterogeneous but known independent distributions. Kleinberg and
Weinberg, 2012 show a tight 2-approximation prophet inequality for this problem. Again, we focus
on approximations to the optimum online policy instead and show that both of these problems are
amenable to polynomial time approximations with any degrees of accuracy.
Main results: we give Polynomial Time Approximation Schemes (PTAS) for the produc-
tion constrained Bayesian selection problem, as well as its generalization to the laminar
Bayesian selection problem when the depth of the laminar family is bounded by a constant.
2
Overview of the techniques. We start by characterizing the optimum online policy for both of
the problems through a Linear Programming formulation. The LP formulations capture Bellman’s
dynamic program by tracking the state of the system through allocation and state variables (see Sec-
tion 2 for more details) and express the conditions for a policy to be feasible and online implementable
as linear constraints. The resulting LPs are exponentially big but they accept polynomial-sized relax-
ations with a small error. Furthermore, the relaxations can be rounded and implemented as online
implementable policies, in the same way as exponential-sized LPs.
More precisely, we propose a hierarchy of linear programming relaxations that systematically
strengthen the commonly used “ex-ante” LP formulation of the problem and approximate the op-
timum solution with any degrees of accuracy. The first level of our LP hierarchy is the ex-ante
relaxation, which is a simple linear program requiring that the allocation satisfies the capacity con-
straint(s) only in expectation. It is well-known that the integrality gap of this LP is 2 [Düetting et al.,
2017, Alaei, 2014]. At the other extreme, the linear program is of exponential size and is equivalent
to the dynamic program.
Given  as the error parameter of the desired PTAS, we show how to choose a linear program that
combines the constraints of these two LPs in a careful way to get -close to the optimum solution. In
a nutshell, this hierarchy is parametrized by how we divide up the capacity constraints into “large”
and “small”. In the production constrained Bayesian selection, we simply consider two cases based on
shipping capacity being large or small (right figure). In the laminar Bayesian selection, we consider
the tree corresponding to the laminar family of constraints. Our approach here is based on chopping
the tree (with the constraints as its internal nodes) by a horizontal cut, and then marking the
constraints above the cut as large and below the cut as small (left figure). The final relaxation then
needs to respect all the small constraints exactly and all the large constraints only in expectation.
Our final algorithms start by reducing the capacities of large bins by a factor of (1 − ) to
create some slack, solve the corresponding LP relaxation, and then adaptively round the solution. A
coupling argument shows that the LP solution can be implemented with an adaptive online pricing
policy (potentially with randomized tie-breaking). However, the resulting online policy respects the
large constraints only in expectation. The main technical ingredient of the remaining analysis is
establishing negative cylinder dependency between the allocation events of this policy; this in turn
leads to concentration results on the number of allocated items in large bins (e.g. see Dubhashi and
Ranjan, 1998), and shows that the policy only violates the large capacity constraints with a small
probability.
In the first problem, the negative dependency analysis uses a very careful argument that essentially
establishes submodularity of the value function of the dynamic program. See Section 2 for the details.
Surprisingly, the negative dependency of optimum online policies no longer holds for laminar matroids
with arbitrary arrival order of elements. We present examples in which the event that one agent
accepts the offered price leads the optimum online to offer a lower price to the next agent! In this
case, we use a different trick by carefully chopping the laminar tree and marking the constraints to
ensure negative dependency. See Section 3 for the marking algorithm and its analysis.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formalize the production constrained
Bayesian selection problem and describe our solution. In Section 3 we generalize our techniques to
the laminar Bayesian selection problem.
Further related work. Besides the combinatorial settings mentioned earlier, constraints such as
knapsack [Feldman et al., 2016], k-uniform matroids (for better bounds) [Hajiaghayi et al., 2007,
Alaei, 2014], or even general downward-closed [Rubinstein, 2016] have been studied in the literature
on prophet inequalities. Moreover, many variations such as prophet inequalities with limited sam-
ples form the distributions [Azar et al., 2014], i.i.d. and random order prophets [Esfandiari et al.,
2017, Abolhassani et al., 2017, Azar et al., 2018], and free-order prophets [Yan, 2011] have been
explored, and connections to the price of anarchy [Düetting et al., 2017], online contention resolution
schemes [Feldman et al., 2016, Lee and Singla, 2018], and online combinatorial optimization [Göbel
et al., 2014] have been of particular interest in this literature. Finally, techniques and results in
this literature had an immense impact on mechanism design [Chawla et al., 2010, Cai et al., 2012,
Feldman et al., 2013, Babaioff et al., 2015, Cai et al., 2016, Chawla and Miller, 2016]. For a full list,
refer to Lucier, 2017.
Stochastic optimization problems with similar flavors, either online or offline, have also been
massively studied both in the computer science and the operations research literature. Examples
include (but not limited to) stochastic knapsack [Dean et al., 2004, Bhalgat et al., 2011, Ma, 2014],
online stochastic matching [Manshadi et al., 2012], stochastic probing [Chen et al., 2009, Gupta et al.,
2016], and pre-planning in stochastic optimization [Immorlica et al., 2004]. Closest to our work in
the computer science literature are [Li and Yuan, 2013] and the recent work of Fu et al., 2018. The
closest work in the operations research literature to our paper is [Halman et al., 2014]. These papers
also obtain PTASs for some specific stochastic dynamic programs; however they diverge from our
treatment both in terms of techniques, results, and the category of the problems they can solve.
2 Production Constrained Bayesian Selection
The goal of this section is to first formalize the production constrained Bayesian selection problem,
and then propose a PTAS for the optimal online policy for maximizing social-welfare. On our way
to achieve this goal, we will discuss an exponential-sized dynamic program and how it can also be
written as a linear program. We further relax this linear program and explore how it can be rounded
to a feasible online policy without a considerable loss in expected social-welfare. The combination of
these two ideas gives us our first polynomial time approximation scheme.
2.1 Problem description
Consider a firm that produces multiple copies of m different product types over time. The firm offers
these items in an online fashion to n arriving unit-demand buyers, where each buyer is interested
in one type and has a private valuation drawn independently from a possibly different but known
distribution. We further assume the ordering of buyers and their types are known in advance. Our
goal is to find a feasible online policy for allocating the items to the buyers to maximize social-welfare,
or equivalently sum of the valuations of all the served buyers. A feasible policy should respect the
production constraints, i.e. at any time the number of sold items of each type is no more than the
number of produced items. Moreover, it should respect the shipping constraint, i.e. the total number
of sold items does not exceed the total shipping capacity of K.2
2As a running example throughout the paper, the reader is encouraged to think of TESLA Inc. as the firm and its
different models of electric cars, i.e. Model 3, Model X and Model S, as different product types.
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We assume each buyer t = 1, . . . , n has private value vt drawn independently from the value
distribution Ft (which can be atomic or non-atomic). Buyers arrive at continuous times over the
span of T days, and reveal their value upon arrival.3 Suppose by the beginning of day i, the firm
has received (or produced) kji units of type j. Let B
j
i ⊆ [n] (referred to as a bin) denote the type j
buyers arriving before day (i+ 1) and Bj , BjT denote the set of all the buyers of type j. See Fig. 1
for more details.
Figure 1: The arrivals of the buyers are indicated by points ×(blue), ◦(red) and (green) representing
different types. Arrows of different colors indicate points in time (beginning of different days in our
model) at which the productions of different types happen.
Throughout the paper, we will focus on characterizing the optimal online policy and will evaluate
our algorithms against that benchmark. In that sense, we deviate from the prophet inequality
framework that compares various policies against the omniscient prophet or equivalently the optimum
offline. It is not hard to see, and we will show this later, that these two benchmarks could be off by
a factor 2 of each other even for the special case of single item prophet inequality (see also Kleinberg
and Weinberg, 2012).
2.2 A simple exponential-sized dynamic program
Our production constrained Bayesian selection problem can be solved exactly using a simple
exponential-sized dynamic program. Let ~s = [s1, s2, ..., sm] ∈ Zm be the vector maintaining the
current number of sold products of different types. We say ~s is a feasible state at time t if it can be
reached at time t by a feasible online policy respecting all production constraints and the shipping
constraint. It is possible to check whether ~s is feasible at time t using a simple greedy algorithm.
Define Vt(~s) to be the maximum total expected welfare that an online policy can obtain from
time t to time n given ~s. Define Vt(~s) = −∞ when s is not feasible at time t and Vn+1(~s) = 0 for all
~s. We can compute Vt(s) for the remaining values of s and t recursively as follows. At time t, the
policy offers the buyer the price τ = τt(~s). Depending on whether or not the value of the customer
3Although the main goal of this paper is the selection problem and not the incentive compatible mechanism design,
as we will see later, all of our policies are pricing and hence truthful for myopic buyers.
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is above τ , the mechanism obtains either vt +Vt+1(~s+~ejt) or Vt+1(~s), where ex is the standard basis
vector with a single non-zero entry of value 1 at location x and jt is the request type of buyer t. The
probability of each event can be computed using the distribution of valuation of buyer t. Therefore,
the dynamic programming table can be computed using the following rule also known as the Bellman
equation:
Vt(~s) = max
τ
(Evt∼Ft [(vt + Vt+1(~s+ ~ejt)) · 1[vt ≥ τ ]] + Evt∼Ft [Vt+1(~s) · 1[vt < τ ]]). (1)
Note that the price τt(~s) = Vt+1(~s)−Vt+1(~s+~ejt) maximizes the above equation, and so the final
prices of an optimal online policy can be computed easily given the table values.
The above dynamic program has an exponentially large table. In the rest of this section, we
describe a linear programming formulation equivalent to the above dynamic program, a natural
relaxation for the LP, and a randomized rounding of the relaxation that yields a PTAS.
2.3 Linear programming formulation and ex-ante relaxation
An online policy can be fully described by allocation variables Xt(~s, v), where for every time t and
state ~s, Xt(~s, v) represents the conditional probability of the event that the buyer at time t is served
and the state upon her arrival is ~s, conditioned on vt = v. We further use state variables Yt(~s) to
represent the probability of the event that an online policy reaches the state ~s upon the arrival of
buyer t, and auxiliary variables Xt(v) for the marginal allocation probability of buyer t conditioned
on vt = v.
Having this description, the LP formulation of the dynamic program in Section 2.2 is a combina-
tion of two new ideas. The first idea is to ensure the feasibility of the policy by adding the constraint
Yt(~s) = 0 to the linear program for an infeasible state ~s at time t. The second idea is to add another
constraint describing how the probability Yt(~s) updates from time t to t + 1 as the result of the
probabilistic decision made by the policy at time t. As will be elaborated more later, this constraint
is the necessary and sufficient condition for any policy to be implementable in an online fashion.
Let the set S ⊂ Zm be a finite set containing all possible feasible states at any time t.4 Consider
the following exponential-sized (both in the number of variables and constraints) linear program:
maximize
n∑
t=1
Evt [vt · Xt(vt)]
subject to {Xt(~s, v),Xt(v),Yt(~s)} ∈ Popt ,
(LP1)
where Popt is the polytope of point-wise feasible online policies, defined by these linear constraints:
Xt(v) =
∑
~s∈S
Xt(~s, v) ∀v, t = 1, 2, . . . , n,
0 ≤ Xt(~s, v) ≤ Yt(~s) ∀v, ~s ∈ S, t = 1, 2, . . . , n,
Yt+1(~s) = Yt(~s)− Evt [Xt(~s, vt)] + Evt [Xt(~s− ~ejt , vt)] ∀~s ∈ S, t = 1, . . . , n− 1 (state update)
Y1(~0) = 1
Yt(~s) = 0 ∀~s ∈ ∂S(t), t = 2, 3, . . . , n. (feasibility check)
where, as a reminder, jt is the type of the buyer arriving at t and ~ex is the standard basis vector with
a single non-zero entry of value 1 at location x. We also use ∂S(t) to denote the set of all forbidden
4For the ease of exposition, we do not consider time-specific state spaces. In particular, let S to be the set of all
possible states that can happen by serving a subset of buyers of size at most K. This set contains O(nK) states, where
at any time t only a subset of them are actually reachable.
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neighboring states at time t. It is easy to see that the the set ∂S(t) has at most O(nK+1) states.
∂S(t) , {~s ∈ Zm : [~s is not a feasible state upon the arrival of buyer t] & [∃j s.t. ~s− ~ej ∈ S]}
It is also not hard to see that any feasible online policy induces a feasible assignment for the
linear program (LP1). The only tricky constraint to check is the constraint corresponding to the
“state update”. To do so, note that the online policy will reach the state ~s at time t+ 1 if and only if
either the state at time t is ~s and the buyer t is not served, or the state at time t is ~s− ~ejt and the
buyer t gets served, evolving the state from ~s− ~ejt to ~s− ~ejt + ~ejt = ~s.
More importantly, we show the converse holds by proposing an exact rounding algorithm in the
form of an adaptive pricing with randomized tie-breaking policy; such a policy offers the price τt(~s)
to buyer t if the current state is ~s. In case of a tie (vt = τt(~s)), the pricing policy breaks the tie
independently with probability pt(~s), in favor of selling the item.
Proposition 2.1. There exists an adaptive pricing policy with randomized tie breaking, whose ex-
pected social-welfare is equal to the optimal solution of the linear program (LP1) and is a feasible
online policy for the production constrained Bayesian selection problem.
We postpone the formal proof and a discussion on how to compute prices and tie-breaking prob-
abilities (given the LP optimal assignment) to Appendix A, and just sketch the main ideas here.
Proof sketch. Let {X ∗t (~s, v)} and {Y∗t (~s)} be the optimal solutions of LP1. Consider the following
simple online randomized rounding scheme: start from the all-zero assignment at time t < 1. Now,
suppose at time t ≥ 1, the current state, i.e., number of sold products of different types, is ~s and the
realized buyer value is vt = v. The rounding algorithm first checks whether Y∗t (~s) is zero. If yes, it
skips the buy request. Otherwise, it accepts the request with probability X
∗
t (~s,v)
Y∗t (~s) .
It is not hard to show this simple scheme will have allocation and state probabilities matching
the LP optimal assignment, i.e. {X ∗t (~s, v)} and {Y∗t (~s)}. Moreover, Y∗t (~s) = 0 for all forbidden
neighboring states ~s, i.e. infeasible states that can only be reached from a feasible state at time t
by accepting an extra request. Hence an inductive argument shows that the resulting online policy
is always feasible. There is also a simple coupling argument, with shifting the probability masses to
higher values, showing that the above algorithm can be implemented using an adaptive pricing policy
with the randomized tie breaking. Prices and probabilities can then be computed by straightforward
calculations.
Ex-ante relaxation. LP1 has exponential size. Nevertheless, without a shipping constraint, it can
be solved in polynomial time. In fact, any online policy can be decomposed into m separate online
policies for type-specific sub-problems; in each sub-problem, its corresponding policy only requires
to respect the production constraints of its type. At the same time, the dynamic programming
table of each sub-problem j is polynomial-sized, as the state at time t is essentially the number of
sold products of type j before t. Therefore the overall optimal online policy can be computed in
polynomial time.
What if we relax the shipping constraint to hold only in expectation (over the randomness of
the policy/values)? This relaxation is used in the prophet inequality literature [Alaei et al., 2015,
Feldman et al., 2016, Düetting et al., 2017, Lee and Singla, 2018], where is termed as the ex-ante
relaxation.
Similar to the linear program of the optimal online policy (LP1), we formulate the ex-ante relax-
ation as an LP. First, re-define S , [1 : maxj kjT ] to be the set of possible states of each sub-problem.5
5Notably, we only need S to be a superset pf all feasible states of each sub-problem j at any time t.
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Second, for each type j and buyer t ∈ Bj , we use allocation variables Xt(sj , v), marginal variables
Xt(v), and state variables Yt(sj), where sj represents the number of sold items of type j before the
arrival of buyer t. We further use variables Nj to represent the expected number of served buyers of
each type j.
maximize
n∑
t=1
Evt [vt · Xt(vt)]
subject to
∑
t∈Bj
Evt [Xt(vt)] ≤ Nj , j = 1, . . . ,m.
{Xt(sj , v),Xt(v),Yt(sj)}t∈Bj ∈ Psubj , j = 1, . . . ,m.
m∑
j=1
Nj ≤ K. (shipping capacity in expectation)
(LP2)
where Bj ⊆ [n] is the set of all buyers of type j and Psubj is the polytope of point-wise feasible online
policies for serving type j buyers, defined by the following set of linear constraints (similar to LP1):
Xt(v) =
∑
sj∈S
Xt(sj , v) ∀v, t ∈ Bj ,
0 ≤ Xt(sj , v) ≤ Yt(sj) ∀v, sj ∈ S, t ∈ Bj ,
Yt(sj) = Yt′(sj)− Evt′ [Xt′(sj , vt′)] + Evt′ [Xt′(sj − 1, vt′)] ∀sj ∈ S, t, t′ ∈ Bj , (state update)
[t′ + 1 : t− 1] ∩Bj = ∅
Yt0(0) = 1 t0 = min{t ∈ Bj}
Yt(sj) = 0 ∀sj ∈ ∂Sj(t), t ∈ Bj . (feasibility check)
where ∂S(t) is the set of all forbidden neighboring states of the sub-problem of type j at time t, i.e.
∂Sj(t) ,
{
s ∈ Z : [s is greater than the total production of type j up to time t] &
[
s ≤ max
j
kjT + 1
]}
Note that because of the collapse of the state space, LP2 program has polynomial size.
As every online policy for our problem induces a feasible online policy for each request type j,
and because it respects the shipping capacity point-wise, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. LP2 is a relaxation of the optimal online policy for maximizing expected social-
welfare in the production constrained Bayesian selection problem.
2.4 Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS)
Given parameter  > 0, our proposed polynomial time approximation scheme is based on solv-
ing a linear program with size polynomial in n and an adaptive pricing mechanism with random-
ized tie breaking that rounds this LP solution to a (1−O())-approximation. For notation pur-
poses here and in Section 2.5, let {X ∗t (~s, vt),X ∗t (vt),Y∗t (~s)} be the optimal assignment of LP1, and
{X ∗t (sj , vt),X ∗t (vt),Y∗t (sj),N ∗j } be the optimal assignment of LP2 for the buyers t ∈ Bj .
Overview. Consider the linear program of the optimal online policy (LP1) and the ex-ante relax-
ation (LP2). For a given constant δ > 0, we turn to one of these linear programs, depending on
whether the shipping capacity K is small (K ≤ 1δ ) or large (K > 1δ ). In the former case, we pay the
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computational cost of solving LP1 and then round it exactly to a point-wise feasible online policy.
In the latter case, we first reduce the large shipping capacity K by a factor of (1 − ) to create
some slack, and then solve LP2 with this reduced shipping capacity (which has polynomial size). We
then round the LP solution exactly by an adaptive pricing with randomized tie breaking policy. The
hope is the resulting online policy respects all the constraints of the production constrained Bayesian
selection problem with high probability because:
1. For every type j, the policy respects the corresponding production constraints point-wise.
2. The policy respects the reduced large shipping capacity in expectation.
3. Moreover, we show that the total number of served buyers concentrates because of the negative
dependency of the selection rule.
4. Finally, due to the available slack in the large shipping capacity and because of the mentioned
concentration, this capacity is exhausted with small probability.
The algorithm. More precisely, we run the following algorithm (Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 PTAS-Production-Constrained (, δ)
1: Input parameters , δ > 0.
2: if
(
K ≤ 1δ i.e. when shipping capacity is small
)
then
3: Solve the linear program of optimal online policy (LP1).
4: Given the optimal assignment, extract adaptive prices τt(~s) and tie-breaking probabilities τt(~s) ,∀~s ∈ S.
5: else
(
K > 1δ i.e. when shipping capacity is large
)
6: Reduce the shipping capacity K by a multiplicative factor (1− ).
7: Solve the ex-ante relaxation linear program (LP2) with the reduced shipping capacity of K(1− ).
8: for product types j = 1, 2, . . . ,m do
9: Given the optimal assignment corresponding to the variables of type j, extract adaptive prices
τt(sj) and tie-breaking probabilities pt(sj) for every sj ∈ S and every buyer t such that jt = j.
10: end for
11: end if
12: Offer the adaptive prices (with randomized tie breaking) computed above to arriving buyers based on
their types j.6 In the exceptional cases when there is no remaining shipping capacity, offer the price of
infinity.
Computing prices and tie-breaking probabilities. Given {X ∗t (~s, vt),Y∗t (~s)}, the proof of
Proposition 2.1 in Appendix A (sketched in Section 2.3) gives a recipe to find τt(~s) and pt(~s) ef-
ficiently, so that the corresponding adaptive pricing with randomized tie-breaking policy maintains
the same expected marginal allocation Evt [X ∗t (~s, vt)] as the optimal online policy for every buyer t
and state ~s ∈ S, while having at least the same expected social-welfare.
For the case of large shipping capacity, we apply exactly the same argument for each sub-problem
j separately. Given {X ∗t (sj , vt),Y∗t (sj),N ∗j } for t ∈ Bj , we can efficiently find prices τt(sj) and
probabilities pt(sj), so that the corresponding adaptive pricing with randomized tie-breaking for
buyers with type j maintains the same expected marginal allocation Evt [X ∗t (sj , vt)] for every t ∈ Bj
and sj ∈ S, while having at least the same expected social-welfare from serving each individual buyer
of type j.
6Note that when K is large, we run separate pricing policies for each type j. Hence, given the type of buyer t, its
offered price and tie-breaking probability is determined based on the current state of the sub-problem jt, namely sjt .
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Feasibility, running time and social-welfare. Clearly, Algorithm 1 is a feasible online policy
in the case of small shipping capacity (Proposition 2.1). In the case of large shipping capacity, as
Y∗t (sj) = 0 for any forbidden neighboring state of sup-problem j, the same argument shows that it
respects all of the production constraints of each type j. The policy also never violates the shipping
capacity by construction, and hence is feasible. In terms of running time, the linear program of
optimal online policy LP1 has at most n
1
δ states, as no more than 1δ requests can be accepted. By
setting δ = 2/ log(1/), Algorithm 1 has running time poly(n
log(1/)
2 ). We further show that its
expected welfare is at least (1 − O()) fraction of the expected welfare of the optimal online policy
(whose proof is deferred to Section 2.4.1, Proposition 2.6).
Theorem 2.3 (PTAS for optimal online policy). By setting δ = 
2
log(1/) , Algorithm 1 is a (1−O())-
approximation for the expected social-welfare of the optimal online policy of the production constrained
Bayesian selection problem, and runs in time poly(n
log(1/)
2 ).
Corollary 2.4 (PTAS to maximize revenue). By applying Myerson’s lemma from Bayesian mecha-
nism design [Hartline, 2012, Myerson, 1981] and replacing each buyer value vt with her ironed virtual
value φ¯t(vt), Theorem 2.3 gives a PTAS for the optimal online policy for maximizing expected-revenue.
2.4.1 Analysis of the algorithm (proof of Theorem 2.3)
If the shipping capacity is small, i.e. K ≤ 1δ , Algorithm 1 has the optimal expected social-welfare
among all the feasible online policies, because of the optimality of LP1 (Proposition 2.1). Next
consider the ex-ante relaxation LP in the case when K > 1δ . By Proposition 2.2, its optimal solution
is an upper bound on the social-welfare of any feasible online policy. By scaling the shipping capacity
by a factor (1− ), we change the optimal value of this LP by only a multiplicative factor of at least
(1− ).
As sketched before, for each type j the adaptive pricing policies {τt(sj), pt(sj)} extract an expected
value from buyer t that is at least equal to the contribution of this buyer to the objective value of
the ex-ante relaxation LP. However, buyer t can be served by the adaptive pricing policy of type jt
only if the large shipping capacity has not been exceeded yet. So, to bound the loss, the only thing
left to prove is that the probability of this bad event is small (as small as O()).
Concentration and negative cylinder dependency. In the case when the shipping capacity is
large, let Xt ∈ {0, 1} be a Bernoulli random variable, indicating whether the resulting pricing policy
of type jt serves the buyer t or not. Note that
∑
t E[Xt] ≤ (1 − )K, as LP2 ensures feasibility
of the shipping constraint in expectation. Now, if the total count
∑
tXt concentrates around its
expectation, we will be able to bound the probability of the bad event that the shipping capacity is
exceeded.
Clearly, {Xt}t∈B1 , {Xt}t∈B2 , . . . , {Xt}t∈Bm are mutually independent, as we run a separate adap-
tive pricing policy for each type j. However, the indicators random variables of the same type are not
mutually independent with each other. So, for proving the required concentration, Chernoff bound
cannot be applied immediately. Yet, we can use a certain variant of negative dependency instead
of independence [Dubhashi and Ranjan, 1998, Pemantle, 2000, Chekuri et al., 2009], known as the
negative cylinder dependency, and still prove Chernoff-style concentration bounds.
Definition 2.5 (Negative cylinder dependency, Pemantle [2000]). Random variables X1, ..., Xn sat-
isfy the negative cylinder property if and only if for every S ⊆ [1 : n],
E[
∏
t∈S
Xt] ≤
∏
t∈S
E[Xt] (2)
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We now prove the following proposition, assuming the required negative cylinder dependency.
Proposition 2.6. If for every request type j, the random variables {Xt}t∈Bj satisfy the negative
cylinder dependency and if K > 1δ =
log(1/)
2
, then the probability that the shipping capacity K is
exhausted is O().
Proof. Applying the negative cylinder dependency property, for every α > 0 we have:
E[
∏
t
eαXt ] = E[
∏
j∈[m]
∏
t∈Bj
(1 + (eα − 1) ·Xt)]
(1)
≤
∏
t
(1 + (eα − 1) · E[Xt]) =
∏
t
E[eαXt ], (3)
where in (1) we use the negative cylinder property among {Xt}t∈Bj for each type j, and the mutual
independence of the Bernoulli variables across different types. Now, as Eq. (3) is essentially the first
step of the proof of Chernoff bound, it ensures that we have a Chernoff-type concentration [Dubhashi
and Ranjan, 1998]. Therefore, as
∑
t E[Xt] ≤ (1− )K, we have:
P[
∑
t
Xt > K] ≤ P[
∑
t
(Xt − E[Xt]) > K] ≤ e−K
2
3 = O(). 
2.5 Negative cylinder dependency for optimal online policy
Fix a product type j. For notation simplicity, re-index {Xt}t∈Bj as Xt1 , . . . , Xtl , where t1 ≤ t2 ≤
. . . ≤ tl and l , |Bj |. To show {Xti} satisfy the negative cylinder dependency, it is enough to show
that:
∀i ∈ [1 : l], S ⊆ [1 : l] : P[Xti = 1 |
⋂
i′∈S
{Xti′ = 1}] ≤ P[Xti = 1] (4)
To see this, note that Xt ∈ {0, 1}. Hence if Eq. (4) holds, we have
E[
l∏
i=1
Xti ] = P[
l⋂
i=1
{Xti = 1}] =
l∏
i=1
P[Xti = 1|
⋂
j≤i−1
{Xtj = 1}]
Eq. (4)
≤
l∏
i=1
P[Xti = 1] =
l∏
i=1
E[Xti ]
which shows the negative cylinder dependence. Given this simple observation, one needs to show
that for the adaptive pricing with randomized tie-breaking used in Algorithm 1, the probability of
accepting a buy request at time t can only decrease conditioned on more requests being accepted in
the past. Another neat observation is that given N ∗j as the optimal soft shipping capacity that needs
to hold only in expectation, {X ∗t (sj , vt),X ∗t (vt),Y∗t (sj)} for t ∈ Bj is indeed the optimal solution of
the following linear program.
maximize
∑
t∈Bj
Evt [vt · Xt(vt)]
subject to
∑
t∈Bj
Evt [Xt(vt)] = N ∗j , (soft shipping constraint)
{Xt(sj , v),Xt(v),Yt(sj)}t∈Bj ∈ Psubj .
(LP-subj)
Therefore, it is enough to show the same property holds for another adaptive pricing with randomized
tie-breaking algorithm that is used for exactly rounding LP-subj , as both of these rounding algorithms
have the same allocation distribution for the buyers of type j.
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For simplicity of the proofs in this section, we assume that the valuations are non-atomic.7 Note
that under this assumption, there will be no need for randomized tie breaking, and indeed our
rounding algorithm will be a pure adaptive pricing. We now prove our claim in two steps.
1. Step 1: by using LP duality, we show that the optimal online policy of the sub-problem of type
j with an extra soft shipping constraint N ∗j is indeed the optimal online policy for an instance
that has no soft constraint and all the values are shifted by some number λ∗, i.e. vˆt = vt − λ∗.
2. Step 2: we show that the optimal online policy of a particular sub-problem j, whether value
distributions have negative points in their support or not, satisfies the negative cylinder depen-
dency.
Putting the two pieces, we prove the negative cylinder dependency among Xt1 , ..., Xtl as desired. In
the remaining of this section, we prove the two steps.
Proof of Step 1. Consider (LP-subj) that captures the optimal online policy of sub-problem j. We
start by moving the soft shipping constraint into the objective of of (LP-subj) and writing the
Lagrangian.
minimize
λ
maximize
X
L(X , λ) =
∑
t∈Bj
Evt [vt · Xt(vt)] + λ(N ∗j −
∑
t∈Bj
Evt [Xt(vt)])
{Xt(sj , v),Xt(v),Yt(sj)}t∈Bj ∈ Psubj .
Let λ∗ be the optimum dual solution. By dropping the constant terms and rearranging we get the
following equivalent program for the optimal solution:
maximize
∑
t∈Bj
Evt [(vt − λ∗) · Xt(vt)]
{Xt(sj , v),Xt(v),Yt(sj)}t∈Bj ∈ Psubj .
This shows that the optimal online policy respecting the soft shipping constraint N ∗j is equivalent
to the optimal online policy for an instance of the problem where all the values are shifted by some
constant λ∗.
Proof of Step 2. We only need to show that the negative cylinder dependency holds for the dynamic
programming that solves each sub-problem, as the distributions are non-atomic and there is a unique
deterministic optimal online policy, characterized both by the LP and the dynamic programming.
Consider sub-problem j. We use induction to show by serving more customers in the past, the prices
for new buyers increase. Let sjt denote the total number of products of type j that have been sold
up to the arrival of buyer t. Note that the algorithm only needs sjt to decide whether buyer t should
be served.
Let Dt(s
j
t ) denote the maximum total expected welfare that an online policy can obtain from time
t to n, assuming that it starts from state sjt . Also let C
j
t denote the set of production checkpoints of
type j that occur at or after time t. Using the Bellman equations we have
Dt−1(s
j
t−1) =

Dt(s
j
t−1) if min
({
kji − sjt−1
}
i∈Cjt−1
)
= 0
Evt−1
[
max(Dt(s
j
t−1 + 1) + vt−1, Dt(s
j
t−1))
]
if min
({
kji − sjt−1
}
i∈Cjt−1
)
> 0
7For the case of atomic distributions, one can think of dispersing each value distribution first to get non-atomic
distributions, and then proving negative cylinder dependency for any small dispersion. Then the negative cylinder
dependency for the original atomic distribution can be deduced from negative cylinder dependency of the dispersed
distribution for small enough dispersion.
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As the base of our induction, we know that if we serve the last buyer, the probability that we
serve any other buyers does not increase. Now assume while serving buyer t, we have
Dt(s
j
t )−Dt(sjt + 1) ≤ Dt(sjt + 1)−Dt(sjt + 2). (5)
Note that this shows the price offered to buyer t increases if we serve more buyers before buyer t.
When buyer t− 1 arrives, we need to show
Dt−1(s
j
t−1)−Dt−1(sjt−1 + 1) ≤ Dt−1(sjt−1 + 1)−Dt−1(sjt−1 + 2) (6)
which is equivalent to
Dt−1(s
j
t−1) +Dt−1(s
j
t−1 + 2) ≤ 2Dt−1(sjt−1 + 1).
Note that this property is linear in the terms involved. So it is enough to assume that the value vt−1
is deterministic first and prove the above inequality. Then by linearity of expectation, the inequality
would hold in the general case.
Note that for the case where min
({
kji − sjt−1
}
i∈Cjt−1
)
< 2, the inequality holds trivially because
we assume Dt−1(s) = −∞ for any non-negative integer s such that min
({
kji − s
}
i∈Cjt−1
)
< 0.
According to our induction hypothesis, if Dt−1(s
j
t−1 + 2) is updated, then the other two variables are
updated as well. More precisely, if Dt−1(s
j
t−1 + 2) = Dt(s
j
t−1 + 3) + vt−1, then
Dt−1(s
j
t−1 + 1) = Dt(s
j
t−1 + 2) + vt−1,
Dt−1(s
j
t−1) = Dt(s
j
t−1 + 1) + vt−1.
In a similar way, if Dt−1(s
j
t−1 + 1) = Dt(s
j
t−1 + 2) + vt−1, then
Dt−1(s
j
t−1) = Dt(s
j
t−1 + 1) + vt−1.
Considering these relations, we have three different cases. (i) none of these variables are updated.
In this case, Eq. (6) turns into Eq. (5) which holds according to our induction hypothesis. (ii) all of
these variables are updated. In this case, Eq. (6) turns into
Dt(s
j
t + 1) + vt−1 −Dt(sjt + 2)− vt−1 ≤ Dt(sjt + 2) + vt−1 −Dt(sjt + 3)− vt−1
which holds again according to the induction hypothesis. Finally, (iii) the case where Dt−1(s
j
t−1) is
updated and Dt−1(s
j
t−1 + 2) is not updated. In this case, we can write Eq. (6) as
Dt(s
j
t + 1) + vt−1 +Dt(s
j
t + 2) ≤ 2 max(Dt(sjt + 2) + vt−1, Dt(sjt + 1))
and this always holds because for any two values x, y, x+y2 ≤ max(x, y).
3 Generalization to the Laminar Matroid Bayesian Selection
Another approach to the production constrained Bayesian selection problem is to view it as follows:
for each product type j, nested subsets Bj1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ BjT ⊆ B0 , [n] are given, where B0 has capacity
K and each subset Bji has capacity k
j
i . A subset of requests in [n] is considered to be feasible if
from each subset B0 or Bji no more than their capacities are selected. This alternative view suggests
looking at the problem as a special case of a combinatorially richer stochastic online optimization
problem known as the laminar matroid Bayesian selection [Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2012, Feldman
et al., 2016].
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3.1 Problem description
In a laminar matroid Bayesian selection problem, we have a set of n elements and a laminar family
of subsets of these elements termed as the bins, i.e. a collection F of subsets where for every
B,B′ ∈ F either B ⊆ B′, B′ ⊆ B or B ∩B′ = ∅. It is often helpful to represent the laminar family
as a tree whose internal nodes are the bins and the leaves are the elements. The elements arrive
over time in an arbitrary but known order, and reveal their values. We further assume values are
drawn independently from known heterogeneous distributions. Moreover, each bin B has capacity
kB. The goal is to design an online policy/algorithm for selecting a subset of elements 1, 2, · · · , n
with maximum possible total expected value, so that no more than kB elements are picked from each
bin B. Figure 2 describes how this problem generalizes the production constrained Bayesian selection
problem of Section 2.
Figure 2: Production constrained Bayesian selection as a special case of Laminar Bayesian selection;
each of the types ◦(red), ×(blue), and (green) has a corresponding collection of nested bins (path
laminar), and these bins are inside an outer bin [n] to model the shipping constraint.
We consider generalizing the machinery developed in Section 2 to this problem. Again, similar to
Section 2, we deviate from the prophet inequality framework that compares various policies against
the omniscient prophet or equivalently the optimum offline. Our main result in this section is a
PTAS for the optimal online policy, when the depth of the family (or equivalently the height of the
tree) is constant. We also show that our final algorithm has the form of an adaptive pricing with
randomized tie-breaking.
We further generalize our setting by replacing each singleton element with a laminar Bayesian
selection sub-problem. As a simple corollary, we show our result holds if the optimal online policy
for each sub-problem can be implemented efficiently and satisfies the negative cylinder dependency
(Definition 2.5). Notably, the production constrained Bayesian selection is subsumed under this
corollary as a special case.
3.2 Sketch of our approach
Our general strategy to solve this problem is to first divide the internal nodes of the laminar tree into
large and small bins, similar to what we did for the shipping constraint in the previous section. To
do so, we start from the root, and mark each node as either large or small. Once a bin is marked as
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small, all of its descendants will also be marked as small. Next, inspired by our approach in Section 2,
we proceed with these steps:
1. Finding a linear programming formulation for characterizing feasible online policies in each
small bin. As in Section 2, we use an state update rule (similar to the dynamic programming
update) to help us with this characterization.
2. Writing a hierarchy of linear programming relaxations, where the relaxations are parameterized
by how we divide the bins into small and large. For a given marking, the corresponding
relaxation should select a point-wise feasible online policy in each small bin, and impose global
capacity constraints that hold only in expectation for large bins.
3. Using a particular marking algorithm to select a polynomially solvable linear programming
relaxation in the above mentioned hierarchy.
4. Using an adaptive pricing with randomized tie-breaking to round this LP relaxation.
5. Using a concentration argument to show large capacities are only violated with small probabil-
ities.
We next elaborate more on each of the bullets above, while highlighting the new technical pieces we
need to add to the techniques in Section 2.
3.3 A hierarchy of linear programming relaxations for general laminar matroids
We define a family of linear programming relaxations, parametrized by different markings of bins
into small and large. Given a particular marking, as described in Section 3.2, let L be the set of
large bins and S be the set of maximal small bins.
For an instance of the laminar matroid Bayesian selection problem with laminar family F , an
online policy is said to be at the state ~s ∈ ZF upon the arrival of an element if ~s is the vector
of remaining capacities of all of the bins in F . Given this definition, the state ~s is a sufficient
information to find the optimal online policy from time t to n, for both the allocation and the
expected social-welfare, using (an exponential-time) dynamic programming à la Section 2.2.
To avoid exponentially many states in our hierarchy of LP relaxations, we use the same state-
space structure, but we only track the local state of each maximal small bin in S separately. In other
words, we can think of each maximal small bin B as a separate laminar matroid Bayesian selection
sub-problem with laminar family FB , {B′ ∈ F : B′ ⊆ B}, where each arriving element is only in
one of the sub-problems (because subsets in S form a partition of the set of all elements). Now, if
the arriving element at time t belongs to B ∈ S , the linear program only needs to keep track of the
change in the local state ~s ∈ ZFB of the sub-problem B, i.e. the vector of remaining capacities of
the bins in FB.
For every small bin B, define SB to be the set of all feasible local states of the sub-problem B,
i.e. the set of all possible remaining capacity vectors of the bins in FB, where each vector can be
reached by an online policy for this sub-problem that respects all the capacities in FB . Note that
|SB| ≤ nkB , because no feasible online policy for the sub-problem B can pick more than kB elements.
We now can write a linear program with the following variables and constraints:
Variables. We add allocation variables Xt(~s, v), marginal allocation variables Xt(v) and state vari-
ables Yt(~s) as before, in a similar fashion to the ex-ante relaxation linear program (LP2) in Section 2.
For the variables Xt(~s, v) and Yt(~s), assuming the element arriving at time t belongs to the maximal
small bin B, the vector ~s represents the local state of B right before arrival of this element.
15
Constraints. We add two categories of linear constraints to our LP relaxations:
• Global ex-ante constraints: these constraints ensure that the capacity of all large bins are
respected in expectation, i.e.
∀B ∈ L :
∑
t∈B
Evt [Xt(vt)] ≤ kB
• Local online feasibility constraints: for every bin B ∈ S , similar to LP2, we can define a
polytope PB of feasible online policies that ensures a feasible assignment of the linear program
is online implementable by a feasible policy. So, these constraints will be:
∀B ∈ S : {Xt(~s, v),Xt(v),Yt(~s)} ∈ PB
Polytope of feasible online policies. The polytope PB is defined using exactly the same style
of linear constraints as in Psubj (Section 2.3, LP2), with some slight modifications:
Xt(v) =
∑
~s∈SB
Xt(~s, v) ∀v, t ∈ B,
0 ≤ Xt(~s, v) ≤ Yt(~s) ∀v, ~s ∈ SB, t ∈ B,
Yt(~s) = Yt′(~s)− Evt′ [Xt′(~s, vt′)] + Evt′
[
Xt′(~s+ ~dt′ , vt′)
]
∀~s ∈ SB, t, t′ ∈ B, (Bellman eq.)
[t′ + 1 : t− 1] ∩B = ∅
Yt0([kB′ ]B′∈FB ) = 1 t0 = min{t ∈ B}
Yt(~s) = 0 ∀~s ∈ ∂SB, t ∈ B.
where ~dt ∈ {0, 1}FB is a binary vector denoting which bins in FB will be used if we pick the element
arriving at time t ∈ B,8 and ∂SB is the set of all forbidden neighboring states of sub-problem B, i.e.
∂SB , {~s ∈ ZFB : [~s is an infeasible local state] & [∃~r ∈ SB, t ∈ B, s.t. ~s = ~r − ut]}.
Given these variables and constraints, the LP relaxation corresponding to the marking (S ,L )
(which we show later why is actually a relaxation) can be written down as following.
maximize
n∑
t=1
Evt [vt · Xt(vt)]
subject to
∑
t∈B
Evt [Xt(vt)] ≤ kB ∀B ∈ L (Global ex-ante constraints),
{Xt(~s, t),Yt(~s),Xt(v)} ∈ PB ∀B ∈ S (Local online feasibility constraints).
(LP4)
Again, it is easy to see that any feasible online policy for the sub-problem B ∈ S is represented
by a feasible point inside the polytope PB. As every online policy for the laminar matroid Bayesian
selection problem induces a feasible online policy for each sub-problem B ∈ S (by simulating the
randomness of the policy and values outside of B), and because it respects all the large bin capacity
constraints point-wise, we have the following proposition (formal proof is deferred to Appendix B).
Proposition 3.1. For any marking (S ,L ) of the laminar tree, LP4 is a relaxation of the opti-
mal online policy for maximizing expected social-welfare in the laminar matroid Bayesian selection
problem.
8i.e. for every B′ ∈ FB , ~dt(B′) = 1 if and only if t ∈ B′.
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3.4 Exact rounding through adaptive pricing with randomized tie-breaking
One can also use exactly the same technique as in Section 2 to develop exact rounding algorithms for
the induced optimal solution of LP4 inside each maximal small bin B ∈ S . Formally speaking, given
a particular marking (S ,L ), we show there exists a family of adaptive pricing with randomized tie-
breaking policies
{
τBt (~s), p
B
t (~s)
}
B∈S , where each of these pricing policies exactly rounds the solution
induced by the optimal solution of (LP4) in each small bin B ∈ S .
The above rounding schemes can then be combined with each other, resulting in an online policy
that is point-wise feasible inside each small bin and only ex-ante feasible inside each large bin, i.e. it
only respects the large bin capacity constraints in expectation. The combining procedure is simple:
once an element arrives at time t that belonged to B ∈ S , the algorithm looks at the state of the
bin B (suppose it is ~s), and posts the price τB(~s) with tie-breaking probability pt(~s). The element
is then accepted w.p. 1 if vt > τBt (~s), w.p. 0 if vt < τBt (~s), and w.p. pt(~s) if vt = τBt (~s).
Proposition 3.2. For the laminar Bayesian online selection problem, given any marking (S ,L ) of
the laminar tree, there exists an adaptive pricing policy with randomized tie breaking whose expected
welfare is equal to the optimal solution of the linear program (LP4). Moreover, the resulting policy is
feasible inside each small bin and ex-ante feasible inside each large bin.
Proof sketch. We first employ a simple randomized rounding to show how to exactly round the LP,
and then use a simple coupling argument to argue why the optimal solution should have the form of
a thresholding with randomized tie-breaking. Details of the proof are similar to those of the proof of
Proposition 2.1 and hence are omitted for brevity.
By putting all the pieces together, we run the following algorithm given a particular marking.
Algorithm 2 PTAS-Laminar (S ,L , )
1: Input parameter  > 0.
2: Multiply the capacities of all the large bins B ∈ L by (1− ).
3: Solve the LP relaxation (LP4) for the given marking (S ,L ).
4: Extract adaptive prices {τBt (~s)} and adaptive tie-breaking probabilities {pBt (~s)} for every maximal small
bin B ∈ S and t ∈ B.
5: Run the adaptive pricing with randomized tie breaking for each small bin B ∈ S separately, using the
computed prices and probabilities in step (6). In the exceptional cases when there is no remaining capacity
when a customer arrives, we offer her the price of infinity.
Remark 3.3. Once an element t arrives, the algorithm identifies the maximal small bin B ∈ S that
contains t, and finds the current state ~s in this bin. It then posts the price τBt (~s) with randomized
tie-breaking probability pBt (~s).
Remark 3.4. Given the optimal solution of (LP4), the corresponding prices and tie-breaking prob-
abilities needed by Algorithm 2 can be computed in a similar fashion to the case of nested laminar,
which was explained in Proposition 2.1 (see the related discussion in Appendix A).
3.5 Marking and concentration for constant-depth laminar
In this section, we want to show that our rounding algorithm (Algorithm 2) achieves a (1 − O())
fraction of the expected social-welfare obtained by the optimal online policy. Note that (LP4) is a
relaxation, and scaling down the large capacities decreases the benchmark by at most a factor (1−).
Once an element arrives at time t, consider all large bins B ∈ L that are alongside a path from
this element to the root of the laminar tree. By construction, the expected value extracted from
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this element by the pricing policy would be exactly equal to the contribution of this element to the
objective value of (LP4) (after scaling down the capacities), but only if the element is not ignored;
an element will be ignored, i.e. offered a price of infinity, if one of the mentioned large capacities is
exceeded. Therefore, to show that the loss is bound by O() fraction of total, we only need to show
that the bad event of an element being ignored happens with a probability that is bounded by O().
In order to bound the above probability, we need a concentration bound for the random variable
corresponding to the total number of elements picked in each large bin. Previously in Section 2, we
could show negative (cylinder) dependency among selection indicators of the optimal online policy
for a chain of nested bins (with a particular ordering of the elements), which gave us the required
concentration.
Nevertheless, negative dependency does not hold for general laminar matroids with arbitrary
arrival order of elements. To see this, consider the laminar matroid depicted in Fig. 3 with elements
arriving one by one from e1 to e5. Let e4 and e5 be uniformly distributed on {0, 2} and e3 be
uniformly distributed on {0, 1}. One can see that if e1 is picked, then the price offered to e2 will be
1, while if e1 is discarded the price offered to e2 is 1.25.
 
e3
= 2k1
= 1k2 = 1k3
e1 e4 e2 e5
Figure 3: Bad example indicating the lack of negative dependency for optimal online policy of general
laminar matroid.
We now propose a marking algorithm, parametrized by δ > 0, such that it guarantees the required
concentration. Without loss of generality, assume kB ≤ kB′ for any two bins B and B′, whenever
B is a child of B′ in the laminar tree.9 Let L be the depth of the given instance (which we assume
is constant in this section). Now, for every bin B at depth d of the laminar tree, i.e. when it has
distance d from the root, mark it as small if and only if kB ≤ 1δL−d , and large otherwise (Fig. 4).
The key idea here is that our proposed marking algorithm provides enough separation between a
large bin and its small descendants. In fact, we partition the bins so that the capacity of every large
bin is at least 1δ times the capacity of any of its small immediate descendant bins. This separation
provides us with the required concentration bound.
Theorem 3.5. Using the proposed marking algorithm and by setting δ = 
2
log(1/) , Algorithm 2 is a
(1−O())-approximation for the expected welfare of the optimal online policy in the laminar matroid
Bayesian selection problem with depth L, and runs in time poly(n) assuming L and  to be constant
Proof. For every B′ ∈ S , let CB′ denote the total number of elements picked from this bin. As
maximal small bins S induce a partitioning over the set of all elements, and since Algorithm 2
runs an independent online policy in each bin B′ ∈ S , random variables {CB′}B′∈S are mutually
independent.
Now consider a large bin B ∈ L and suppose B′1, ..., B′m be the small descendant bins that
partition B. Moreover, assume bin B is at depth d of the laminar tree. Hence kB > 1δL−d and
9Otherwise, just drop the constraint on the child.
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Figure 4: Depth-based marking for concentration.
kB′j ≤ 1δL−d−1 for j = 1, ...,m. As the policy inside each small bin B′j is a point-wise feasible
policy, CB′j ≤ kB′j ≤ 1δL−d−1 . Moreover, linear program (LP4) imposes a soft-constraint equal to∑
t∈B′j Evt [X
∗
t (vt)] on each small bin. This soft-constraint should be respected in expectation by
the final pricing policy (due to the construction of our randomized rounding scheme), so E[CB′j ] ≤∑
t∈B′j Evt [X
∗
t (vt)] for all B′j . Because of the global ex-ante constraints, these soft constraints should
respect the large bin capacity constraints of the laminar matroid when large capacities are scaled
down by a factor (1− ). Therefore
m∑
j=1
E[CB′j ] ≤
m∑
j=1
∑
t∈B′j
Evt [X ∗t (vt)] =
∑
t∈B
Evt [X ∗t (vt)] ≤ kB(1− )
Now, by applying simple Chernoff bound for independent random variables {CB′j}mj=1, we have (define
the notation C˜B′j , CB′j · δL−d−1, so that it normalizes the total count to [0, 1]):
P[
m∑
j=1
CB′j > kB] = P[
m∑
j=1
(CB′j − E[CB′j ]) > kB −
m∑
j=1
E[CB′j ]] ≤ P[
m∑
j=1
(CB′j − E[CB′j ]) > kB]
= P[
m∑
j=1
(C˜B′j − E[C˜B′j ]) >  · δL−d−1kB] ≤ exp
(
−
2 · δ2(L−d−1) · k2B
3
∑m
j=1 E[C˜B′j ]
)
≤ exp
(
−
2 · δ2(L−d−1) · kB
3
)
Now, for a particular element t, consider a path from the maximal small bin containing this element
to the root of the laminar tree. This path consists of all the large bins that we need to check whether
their capacities are exceeded or not at the time of the arrival of element t. Therefore, we need to
take a union bound over all such bins. As mentioned earlier, without the loss of generality, we can
assume the capacities of these large bins is an increasing sequence when indexed from lower-levels of
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the tree to the root (otherwise, bad events corresponding to nested bins of the same capacity merge
while we take the union). Let d∗ be the depth of the maximal small bin containing t in the laminar
tree, and Bd be the large bin along the mentioned path at depth d. By applying union bound:
P[∃B ∈ L : t ∈ B,
∑
t′∈B
Xt′ > kB] ≤
d∗+1∑
d=1
e
(
− 
2δ2(L−d−1)kBd
3
)
≤ 2e
(
−
2δ2(L−d∗−1)kBd∗
3
)
≤ 2e
(
− 2
3δ
)
= O()
where the last equality holds as δ = 
2
log(1/) . Accordingly, with probability at least 1−O() none of
these capacities are exceeded at the time that algorithm processes element t. Therefore, because of
the linearity of expectation, Algorithm 2 achieves (1 − O()) fraction of the expected social-welfare
of the optimal online policy. Moreover, the linear program (LP4) has size at most O(n
1
δL ), and
hence the running time is poly
(
n
(
log(1/)
2
)L)
by setting δ = 
2
log(1/) . This running time is poly(n)
assuming L and  are constant.
3.6 Discussion: extension to laminar over non-constant depth sub-problems.
As we saw earlier in Section 3.5, we can prove the correctness of our polynomial time approximation
scheme only if the depth of the laminar family is constant. At the same time, as an observation, if
one thinks of the production constrained Bayesian selection problem as an instance of the laminar
Bayesian selection, then the depth of the corresponding laminar family will simply be T + 1, and
hence is not a constant. Yet, as we saw in Section 2, our approach in that section could yield to a
PTAS. Can we still see this PTAS as a special case of our PTAS for the constant-depth laminar?
This discrepancy can easily be explained by extending our result for the constant depth laminar
Bayesian selection to a generalization where every element is replaced by a sub-problem. With this
view, in the production constrained Bayesian selection we indeed have only a 1-level tree (connecting
the root to the type-specific sub-problems), and each leaf of this 1-level tree plays the role of one
of the type-specific sub-problems. To make the analysis work, we require two things from each sub-
problem. First, a local optimum online policy for each sub-problem, for possibly atomic or even
non-positive value distributions, should be computable in polynomial time. Second, the selection
rule of this local optimum online policy should satisfy the required negative cylinder dependency.
Having these two properties, the proof of this section goes through, as by replacing each element
with a group of negatively dependent elements we still have the required concentration. The proof
of this generalization is basically the same, and so we omit to avoid redundancy.
4 Conclusion
We studied variations of the Bayesian selection problem. In this model, the goal is to serve a subset
of arriving customers, maximizing the expected social welfare while respecting certain capacity or
structural constraints. We presented two polynomial time approximation schemes when the set of
allowable customers is restricted either by joint production/shipping constraints or a laminar family
with constant depth. Our algorithms are based on rounding the solution of a hierarchy of linear
programming relaxations that approximate the optimum solution within any degrees of accuracy.
We take the first stab at designing polynomial time approximation schemes for Bayesian online
selection problems; we hope that benchmarks similar to the type of linear programming hierarchy
that we proposed here can lead to more insights, and new and interesting algorithms for this class of
stochastic online optimization problems (or even beyond).
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A Deferred Proofs of Section 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We show how to round the linear programming solution of (LP1). Let
{X ∗t (~s, v),Y∗t (~s)} be the optimal solution of LP. First consider the following simple online randomized
rounding scheme. It starts from all-zero assignment at time t < 1. Now, suppose at time t ≥ 1, the
current state, i.e. vector of remaining capacities, is ~s and the realized value is vt = v. The rounding
algorithm first checks whether Y∗t (~s) is zero. If yes, it skips the buyer. Otherwise, it flips a coin with
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heads probability X
∗
t (~s,v)
Y∗t (~s) and serves the buyer if the coin flips heads. Note that if we assume for all
possible states ~s′, and all possible value v′ the following holds so far:
∀t′ < t : P[policy serves the buyer t′ and the state at t′ is ~s′ | vt′ = v′] = X ∗t′(~s′, v′),
∀t ≤ t : P[policy reaches the state ~s′ at t′] = Y∗t′(~s′),
then by progressing from t to t+ 1, the same invariant holds because:
P[policy serves the buyer t and the state at t is ~s | vt = v]
=P[policy reaches the state ~s′ at t′] · X ∗t (~s,v)Y∗t (~s) = Y
∗
t (~s) · X
∗
t (~s,v)
Y∗t (~s) = X
∗
t (~s, v)
where in the first line we use that vt ∼ Ft is independently drawn from the past. Moreover,
P[policy reaches the state ~s at t+ 1]
= P[policy reaches the state ~s at t]− P[policy serves the buyer t and the state at t is ~s]+
P[policy serves the buyer t and the state at t is ~s+ ~ult ]
= Y∗t (~s)− Evt [X ∗t (~s, vt)] + Evt [X ∗t (~s+ ~ult , vt)] = Y∗t+1(~s)
where lt is the day during which the tth buyer arrives, and in the last line we used the fact that the
optimal solution of the LP satisfies the state evolution update rule (i.e. the LP constraint).
Putting all the pieces together, we conclude that the mentioned simple randomized rounding
exactly simulates the probabilities predicted by the optimal LP solution, and hence is a point-wise
feasible online policy with the same expected social welfare as the optimal value of the LP.
It only remains to show how an adaptive pricing mechanism with randomized tie breaking can
also round the LP exactly. Let Z∗t (~s, v) , X
∗
t (~s,v)
Y∗t (~s) for every v and ~s where Y
∗
t (~s) 6= 0. By applying
a simple coupling argument, we claim there should exist a threshold τ such that Z∗t (~s, v) = 1 for
v > τ , and Z∗t (~s, v) = 0 for v < τ . If not, one can slightly move the allocation probability mass of the
randomized rounding given vt = v, i.e. Z∗t (~s, v), towards higher values, while maintaining the same
expected marginal allocation Evt [X∗t (~s, vt)]. This ensures that the state evolution probabilities will
remain the same as the original randomized rounding, and hence this improved rounding algorithm
can be coupled after time t with the original randomized rounding (hence, will respect all the capacity
constraints).
This new rounding algorithm achieves strictly more expected total value, a contradiction to the
optimality of the original randomized rounding. Now, if Y∗t (~s) = 0 let τt(~s) = +∞ (so that the
adaptive pricing do not serve the buyer in this situation). Otherwise, let τt(~s) be the threshold at
which Z∗t (~s, v) switched to zero, and let pt(~s) = Z∗t (~s, τt(~s)). With these choices, the adaptive pricing
with randomized tie breaking simulates the conditional probabilities Z∗t (~s, v) and couples with the
original randomized rounding of the optimal LP solution, so it will be an optimal online policy.
How to compute prices and tie-breaking probabilities in Proposition 2.1? Given the opti-
mal assignment of LP1, prices and tie-breaking probabilities can easily be computed. At any time t
and feasible state ~s, find the minimum price τt(~s) for which the probability that the buyer’s value
is above the price is at most Evt [X
∗
t (~s,vt)]
Y∗t (~s) . After finding τt(~s), set the tie-breaking probability to
pt(~s) =
1
P[vt=τt(~s)]
(
Evt [X ∗t (~s,vt)]
Y∗t (~s) − P[vt > τt(~s)]
)
. An straightforward calculation shows this pricing
policy has exactly the same state probabilities and expected social-welfare (LP objective) as of the
LP optimal assignment.
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B Deferred Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Consider the optimal online policy and its induced feasible online policy
for the sub-problem B. Let {Xt(~s, vt)}t∈B be the allocation probabilities and {Yt(~s)}t∈B be the state
evolution probabilities of this policy. First of all, clearly the objective function of the LP is equal to
the expected social welfare of the online policy. Second, Yt0([kB′ ]B′∈FB ) = 1, as the policy has not
yet picked any elements in B when the first element in B arrives. Moreover, the policy respects all
the capacity constraints point-wise. Hence, in the resulting assignment Yt(~s) = 0 for ~s ∈ ∂SB and
the global ex-ante constraints are satisfied.
The only tricky constraint remains to check is the Bellman update constraint of PB. In order to
see the satisfaction of the constraint, note that the policy will reach state ~s at time t if and only if
either the state at time t′ (i.e. the last time an element arrived in B) is ~s and the element at time
t′ is not selected, or the state at time t is ~s+ ~dt′ and the element at time t′ is selected, evolving the
state from ~s+ ~dt′ to ~s+ ~dt′ − ~dt′ = ~s. Therefore, the state evolution probabilities satisfy the Bellman
update constraint.
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